HIDDEN RISKS IN PRIVATE CREDIT
"Private credit" (PC) is a euphemism for businesses known as "Non-Bank Financial Institutions" (NBFI). These include funds run by Blackstone, Apollo, Blue Owl, and many others. They make loans to businesses that are unable to obtain loans from banks due to their small size and/or higher credit (default) risk.
Private credit lenders take in money from many sources including ordinary investors, pension funds, college endowment funds, and wealthy investors all of whom are looking for higher yields than are available in the bond markets. The borrowers are typically not listed on any stock exchange so they have not filed audited financial statements with the SEC that investors can review. Furthermore, their credit risk has not been rated by any of the established credit rating firms.
When you invest money in a private credit vehicle, you have no way to know much of anything about the borrowers or assess the risks the PC lender is taking with your money. You are buying a "Black Box" filled with higher risk loans of unknown market value. If you invest in PC, you need to know that they are not your fiduciary. That means they owe no special duties of care to you. They are free to advance their own interests at your expense. Their only duty of care is not to misrepresent material facts or defraud you - a very low bar.
Because the borrowers' financial facts are not available for your scrutiny, you are entirely dependent on your PC firm to engage in due diligence and accurately report its financial condition to you. If a company that your PC made a loan to is becoming financially stressed, you would expect your firm to "write down" the value of that loan on its books (i.e., mark the loan to its now lower market value) so you, the investor, can keep abreast of the change. Do not count on that happening.
There are many ways your PC firm can hide its growing risks and losses from you. One way is to sell the at-risk loan to a related/subsidiary firm at the loan's original value. The acquiring firm carries the loan on its books at its (overvalued) purchase price. Your firm includes in its reports to you its financial interest in that firm whose asset value is inflated after having overpaid for the loan. This is done to make you believe that the loan has retained its value - when it clearly has not and your firm knows that it has not.
Your firm can also sell a bad loan to another PC firm that is more-eager-than-cautious to put its investors' cash "to work" in order to justify the fees it charges to its investors. Its investors unwittingly pay an inflated price for the loan. "Unwittingly" because they have no means to discover that the loan is impaired.
Unlike banks, PC lenders are not tightly regulated. They seek borrowers willing to pay higher rates of interest. It is common for PC borrowers to pay interest rates of 10-14% or more. This makes PC lending highly profitable - until the loans start going into default in significant numbers which can be expected to happen when the economy next slumps into a recession.
Another downside to investing in private credit firms is a restriction of which most investors are ignorant or have ignored. They knowingly, or unknowingly, agree not to withdraw their investments, except in limited amounts and at limited times. The restriction is in place because the firm's money is tied up in mid-to-longer term loans. Were the PC firm forced to sell its loans to meet large investor redemption requests, it would likely be at "fire sale" prices leading to large capital losses. Some funds permit limited withdrawals, say 5%, but they reserve the right to block (or "gate") redemptions and they have done so.
Ken Griffin, the founder of Citadel, said in an interview with the Financial Times,
The real issue here is the liquidity mismatch between the retail investor and the duration of the investments. We live in a world where retail investors have become accustomed to having immediate liquidity for their investments...investing in private credit is a different story.... Retail was viewed [by PC firms] as a phenomenal channel from which to raise assets, but did the retail investors really understand the nature of the investment they were making?
The Growing Risks
At first blush, it appears that not having banks at risk for sketchy PC loans is welcome news because when those loans start to go bad, taxpayers will not be on the hook to cover the losses as in past crises. But all is not as it appears. That is because banks are big lenders to PC borrowers, directly and indirectly, and in significant amounts. Wells Fargo has $60B in PC exposure, Bank of America $33B, PNC $29B, Citigroup $26B, JP Morgan Chase $22B and Goldman Sachs $21B. Thus, these high risk loans are not ring-fenced from the banking system. As of mid-2025 US banks had made nearly $300B in loans to PC firms. That sum is now far larger.
PC lending is now about twice the size of the high-yield bond market - but not as large as the 2007-09 sub-prime mortgage loans that nearly brought down the entire banking system. Nevertheless, PC loan defaults would ripple through the banking complex that is already saddled with large amounts of questionable consumer debt (mortgage, credit card, etc.).
Recently, BlackRock slashed the value of its $25M loan to the e-commerce company Infinite Commerce Holdings to zero three months after listing it at full value. HSBC has taken a $400M hit when it was discovered that its end-borrower, Market Financial Solutions, had engaged in a major fraud in securing its loans.
At first, HSBC maintained that it had not loaned money to MFS - in an effort to hide its exposure to the company. While technically true, HSBC had instead engaged in "back-leverage" to a private credit unit of Apollo Global Management which then loaned the money to MFS. Banks can obscure the real borrower by lending to intermediaries ("private credit groups") that then pass the bank's money on to either the true borrower or to a "special purpose vehicle" that then lends the money to the borrower. In the event of a default by the end-borrower, the loss quickly runs back up the chain and hits the lending bank because the intermediaries are often under-capitalized, if not mere shells.
The first two sizable hits to PC lenders were First Brands (an auto parts supplier based in Cleveland, Ohio), that filed for bankruptcy in September 2025 with $10B in listed liabilities and far less in very uncertain assets. It is said to have been funded through "opaque [misleading] off-balance sheet financing". First Brands was followed by its subsidiary, Tricolor (a sub-prime lender and used car retailer) that filed for bankruptcy in the same month - amid allegations of massive fraud in its operations (misappropriation of funds and double pledging of assets to support its loans). JP Morgan's CEO Jamie Dimon warns of more such "cockroaches" coming to light. Barrons recently wrote,
While sponsors insist most of the loans are sound, some estimates project a sharp rise in defaults. UBS recently forecast a 15% default rate, nearly triple recent experience.
We have read estimates that as many as 18% of PC borrowers are currently in some form of delinquency/default. Dimon wrote in his recent letter to shareholders that losses for lenders to highly indebted companies will be higher than many expect due to "weak lending standards". Lloyd Blankfein, former CEO of Goldman Sachs Credit added, "I don't feel the storm, but the horses are starting to whinny".
When the dust settles if loan losses are incurred, PC investors will be eager to learn what "due diligence" their PCs engaged in before making their loans. Obviously, not enough. Our guess is "very little" because they were more intent on getting their investors' money loaned out, in order to earn their fees, than ensuring the safety of their investors' money.
A Look at the US Economy
President Trump repeatedly states that inflation is down and the US economy is surging ahead. To test that representation, let us first look at recent layoffs. Some of these reflect the replacement of workers with AI agents, others to shrink bloated workforces and yet others were to free up money to pay for soaring capital expenses - especially AI related. This helps to explain why many recent college grads are finding it difficult to secure employment.
Oracle: 20,000 to 30,000 employees laid off (12-18% of its workforce)
Meta: 8,000 employees (10% of its staff)
Microsoft: 8,000 employees (7% of staff)
Amazon: Following 14,000 layoffs in 2025, another 16,000 are to be let go in 2026
Snap: 1,000 employees
Citigroup: 1,000 in early 2026 with a total goal of cutting 20,000
Morgan Stanley: 2,500 employees
Capital One: 1,100 employees
UPS: 30,000 employees
Nike: 1,400 employees
Disney: 1,000 employees
Walmart: 1,000 employees
General Motors: 1,300 employees
Dow: 4,500 employees
Block: 4,000 employees
HSBC: 20,000 employees
Let us next look at how the US government is managing its affairs. Horribly would not be an overstatement. Its debt has soared to $39 trillion, equal to 125% of GDP, and its annual interest expense exceeds its defense budget. This chart shows the increased bleeding of the Social Security Trust Fund. Since its inception, benefit payments were fully funded with current wage withholdings. The dotted line shows that without prompt attention, benefits will soon have to be reduced by 23%. Likely outcome? Bus loads of outraged retirees ready to storm Washington. What is Congress doing to address this problem? Nothing.
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